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Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Domestic Relations Law
Elana Sbarro*
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - CUSTODY - PARENT AND CHILD - THIRD
PARTY INTERVENTION - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
prospective adoptive parents do not stand in loco parentis when
one parent contests the adoption.
B.A. v. E.E., 741 A.2d 1227 (Pa. 1999).
M was born on January 4, 1996.1 Her parents, E, a sixteen year
old girl, and A, an eighteen-year-old boy, were unmarried and living
with their parents.2 Late in her pregnancy, E resided at the Genesis
House ("Genesis") in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.3 The day after M
was born, E granted custody of M to Genesis.4 Immediately
thereafter, Genesis sought D and C as adoptive parents of M.5 E
consented to the adoption.6 A similar consent form was sent to A,
who refused to sign it.7
Subsequently, D and C started an adoption proceeding.8 On
February 26, 1996, A and his mother filed a complaint for primary
physical custody of M in the Court of Common Pleas, Cambria
County, Civil Division? On July 9, 1996, Honorable Judge Creany
granted a motion to intervene filed by D and C "on the grounds
that they stood in loco parentis to the child" and on November 13,
1996 the judge granted D and C primary physical custody of M.10 A
* Research Editor, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne University
School of Law; B.A. 1996, University of Pittsburgh.
1. B.A. v. A.A., 741 A.2d 1227,1228 (Pa. 1999).
2. B.A., 741 A.2d at 1228. Both parents were in school. Id.
3. Id. The Genesis House, operated by Genesis of Pittsburgh, is an organization that
assists women with adoptions. Id. at 1228 and 1232.
4. Id. at 1228.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. B.A., 741 A.2d at 1228.
8. Id. At the time the opinion was written, the status of the adoption proceeding was
uncertain. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. In loco parentis means that a third party has "assumed obligations incident to
the parental relationship." Id. at 1229.
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and his mother appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court.1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
John P Flaherty, Jr., addressed the issue of whether prospective
adoptive parents, who have had the child in their care and custody
for nine or ten months, may intervene in a custody proceeding
brought by the child's natural father, who is seeking custody of the
child, when the child's natural mother has placed the child with the
adoptive parents and favors adoption.2 "Generally, a third party
may challenge custody only through dependency proceedings."
13
That third party must show that the natural parents are not
properly caring for the child. 14 If the third party is able to show
this, then the third party can intervene in the custody proceeding.
5
An exception to this general rule arises when a party stands in
loco parentis.16 Although this status enables the third party to
intervene in a custody proceeding, "a third party cannot place
himself in loco parentis in defiance of the parents' wishes and the
parent/child relationship."1 7 In the instant case, the supreme court
found that D and C retained custody of M in defiance of A's wishes,
therefore, D and C did not attain in loco parentis status.
8
Justice Russell M. Nigro filed a concurring opinion clarifying that
11. Id. at 1228. The Court held that A bestowed in loco parentis status upon D and C
by surrendering custody to Genesis, who granted custody to D and C. Id. Furthermore, the
court looked to M's physical, spiritual, moral and intellectual well being. Id.
12. B.A., 741 A.2d at 1228. At the supreme court, A was represented by attorney Mary
E. Schellhauner from Southern Allegheny Legal Aid from Johnstown, and D and C were
represented by attorney Linda Rovder Fleming from Johnstown. Id.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., which was
joined by Justices Ralph J. Cappy and Thomas G. Saylor, and concurred with by Justice
Russell M. Nigro. Id. at 1228-29. Justice Nigro filed a separate concurring opinion, joined by
Justice Saylor. Id. at 1229 (Nigro, J., concurring). Justice Stephen A. Zappala filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 1230 (Zappala, J., dissenting). Justice Sandra Schultz Newman filed
a separate dissent, joined by Justice Ronald D. Castille. Id. at 1231 (Newman, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1229. The Juvenile Act, in pertinent part, defines a dependent child as "A
child who is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by
law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental or emotional health, or
morals." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6302 (1982).
15. B.A., 741 A.2d at 1229. In Cardamone v. Elshoff, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
stated, "[Ulnless the natural parents' prima facie right to custody is successfully overcome
via the dependency proceedings, this court cannot confer standing upon third parties to
interfere with the parent child relationship." 659 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
16. B.A., 741 A.2d at 1229.
17. Id. at 1228 (citing Gradwell v. Strausser, 610 A.2d 999, 1003 (Pa Super. Ct. 1992)).
18. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the record established that A
attempted to seek custody of M from her birth until the present. Id. Furthermore, A
countered the adoption of M and sought custody of M himself. Id.
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the prospective adoptive parents failed to achieve in loco parentis
status because the natural father contested the adoption 1 9
Justice Stephen A. Zappala filed a dissenting opinion expressing
his belief that E's consent to D and C's adoption discharged the
natural parents' parental duties and bestowed upon D and C
assumed parental responsibility. 0
Finally, Justice Sandra Schultz Newman filed a dissent opining
that the prospective adoptive parents stood in loco parentis
because they "assumed a parenting role towards the child, had a
legitimate expectation the child was part of their family unit, and
did not assume the status of 'in loco parentis' in defiance of Xs
wishes."2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling is correct. Both A and
Genesis denied the natural father's wishes in putting M up for
adoption. The natural father not only contested the adoption, but
also sought custody of M himself. Therefore, D and C had custody
of M in defiance of the natural father's wishes.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - CHILDREN OUT OF WEDLOCK - PRESUMPTION
OF PATERNITY - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that: (1) the
presumption of paternity is inapplicable when the presumptive
father is divorced from the mother, and (2) the mother is estopped
from seeking a determination of non-paternity against the
presumptive father when the presumptive father has held the child
out as his own during the marriage.
Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1999).
On June 2, 1989 Ruth Fish ("Appellant") gave birth to Z.F.22 At
the time of Z.F.'s birth, Appellant was married to David Fish
("Husband"). 23 When Z.F was conceived, Appellant was having an
extramarital affair with Robert Behers ("Appellee") and was not
involved in sexual relations with her Husband.
24
Although the Husband doubted Z.F.'s paternity, Appellant told
him he was Z.F's father.25 For three years after Z.F.'s birth, the
couple and their children lived as an intact family.26 The Husband
19. Id. at 1229 (Nigro, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 1230 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 1231 (Newman, J., dissenting).
22. Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 722 (Pa. 1999).
23. Fish, 741 A.2d at 722. This was the couple's third child: Id.
24. Id. Appellee knew that he was the father. Id. Appellant also told him that she
intended on having an abortion; but he convinced her not to terminate the pregnancy. Id.
25. Id. Husband was unaware that he was not Z.F's father. Id.
26. Id.
2000
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treated Z.E as his son, giving him emotional and financial support
and claiming the child as a dependent on the couple's joint income
tax returns. 27 Furthermore, Appellant listed Husband's name as the
father on Z.E's birth certificate.
28
Husband discovered the truth about Z.E's paternity in June of
1992.29 Subsequent blood tests revealed that the Husband was not
Z.E's biological father.30 The couple separated .in August of 1992,
and divorced in December of 1993.
31
On April 29, 1994, Appellant filed a child support action against
Appellee in the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Family
Division.32 Appellee filed preliminary objections claiming that: 1)
Appellant could not order blood testing until she overcame the
presumption of Z.E's paternity, and 2) Appellant was estopped from
denying Husband's paternity because she held him out as the father
of Z.F 3 On May 9, 1995, after a review by a court-appointed
hearing officer, the Honorable Lawrence W Kaplan affirmed the
findings of the hearing officer that Appellant was not estopped
from filing a support action against Appellee 4 The Pennsylvania
Superior Court reversed the trial court's holding and held that
Appellant was estopped from denying Husband's paternity.35
27. Id.
28. Fish, 741 A.2d at 722.
29. Id. Appellant told Husband that he was not the father of Z.F Id.
30. Id. Husband asked for the blood testing. Id.
31. Id. The trial court dismissed an October 1992 support action filed by the Husband
against Appellee on the grounds of estoppel. Id. Husband did not appeal. Id. at n.1.
32. Fish, 741 A.2d at 722.
33. Id. In Freedman v. McCandless the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination that because of a
person's conduct (e.g., holding out the child as his own, or supporting the child) that
person, regardless of his true biological status, will not be permitted to deny
parentage, nor will the child's mother who has participated in this conduct be
permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the third party is the true
father. As the Superior Court has observed, the doctrine of estoppel in paternity
actions is aimed at "achieving fairness as between the parents by holding them, both
mother and father, to their prior conduct regarding the paternity of the child."
Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 532-33 (Pa. 1995) (quoting Gulla v. Fitzpatrick, 596
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1991)).
34. Fish, 741 A.2d at 722. The trial court ordered the determination of the issue of
estopple to a hearing officer on June 30, 1994. Id. On September 7, 1994 the hearing officer
ruled in favor of the Appellant. Id.
35. Id. At the time the divorce was finalized, December of 1993, Appellant and
Husband agreed that the Husband would support the two eldest children, but not Z.F Id at
722 n.l The superior court also held that the agreement of supported entered into between
appellant and her husband in December of 1993 null because a parent cannot bargain away
the rights of its child. Ruth F v. Robert B., Jr., 690 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(citing Hyde v. Hyde, 618 A.2d 406 (Pa. 1992)). The supreme court affirmed this holding in a
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Ronald D. Castille, determined the paternity of a child conceived or
born during a marriage by using a two-prong analysis: (1) does the
presumption of paternity apply to the instant case, and if yes, has it
been rebutted?; and (2) if this presumption is rebutted or
inapplicable, then is Appellant estopped from asserting Appellee as
the father? 6 The supreme court first determined that because the
couple divorced in December of 1993, there is no longer an intact
family or marriage to preserve and thus the presumption of
paternity does not apply.
3 7
Since the supreme court concluded that the presumption of
paternity was inapplicable, the court next turned to whether
Appellant is estopped from asserting Appellee's paternity.3 In John
M. v. Paula T, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a party
may be estopped from denying a husband's paternity of a child
born during the marriage if either the husband or the wife has held
the child out as a child of the marriage.3 9 Furthermore, the Court
noted in Jones v. Trojak that the doctrine of estoppel is
inapplicable when the husband failed to accept the child as his
own and/or failed to support the child.
40
In holding that the doctrine of estoppel applied to the instant
case, the supreme court found that the evidence established that
the Husband accepted Z.F. as his child and that there was no
evidence, during the marriage, that Husband did not accept Z.F as
footnote without explanation in its opinion. Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1999).
36. Fish, 741 A.2d at 723. The presumption of paternity is that "a child born to a
married woman is the child of the woman's husband." Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053
(Pa. 1999). In Brinkley v. King, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, set
forth the test to determine the paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage. 701
A-2d 176 (Pa. 1997).
At the supreme court, Appellant was represented by attorneys Carol L. Hanna and Scott W.
Spadafore. Fish, 741 A.2d at 722. Appellee was represented by attorneys Richard F Welch
and Michael E. Fiffik. Id.
Justice Ronald D. Castille wrote for the majority, including Chief Justice John P. Flaherty,
Jr. and Justices Stephen A. Zappala and Ralph J. Cappy. Id. at 722. Justice Russell M. Nigro
filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. at 724-25 (Nigro, J.,
dissenting). Justice Newman filed a separate dissent. Id. at 725 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas G. Saylor did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Id. at 724.
37. Id. at 723. "The underlying policy in presuming paternity is the preservation of
marriage." Id.
38. Id.
39. John T. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990).
40. See Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201, 206 (Pa 1993) (citing Christianson v. Ely, 568
A.2d 966 (Pa. 1990)).
2000
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his child.41 Appellant assured Husband that he was the father, gave
the child his surname, named Husband as the father on the birth
certificate, and listed the child as a dependant on their income tax
returns.42 Moreover, the child was and is still treated as a child of
the marriage.
43
Justice Russell M. Nigro filed a dissenting opinion calling for the
end of the estoppel doctrine, to allow the trial courts to use
evidence of blood tests when considering the best interest of the
child. 4 Justice Nigro reasoned that by allowing courts the
discretion to order blood tests, biological fathers would be unable
to shun parental responsibilities by claiming estoppel.
45
Furthermore, blood tests would eliminate situations in which a man
is tricked into believing that a child is his and then made, through
the doctrine of estoppel, to accept legal responsibility of the child.
46
Justice Sandra Schultz Newman joined Justice Nigro's dissent but
wrote separately to emphasize that the presumption of paternity is
a rebuttable presumption which does not bar the court from
ordering Appellee's blood testing.47 Furthermore, the doctrine of
estoppel also does not bar the court from ordering Appellee to
submit to blood testing.48
Justices Nigro and Newman filed dissenting opinions in both this
case and in Strauser. Justice Nigro argued in both dissenting
opinions that a trial court should have the discretion to order blood
testing of parties contesting paternity. Justice Newman argued that
the presumption of paternity and the estoppel doctrine are
irrebuttable concepts that can be rebutted by reliable scientific
evidence.
The consummation of societal changes with the advancement of
scientific evidence has restructured the "traditional" family unit.
This union has antiquated the concept of estoppel. Hopefully
Justices Nigro and Newman can lead the way for the court to one
day mirror societal norms.
41. Fish, 741 A-2d at. 724.
42. Id. at 723-24.
43. Id. at 724. The court further observed that Z.F. believes that the Husband is his
father, Husband formed a father-son relationship with Z.E, and until Z.E was approximately
five, Husband treated all three children equally. Id.
44. Id. (Nigro, J., dissenting). Justice Newman joined in the dissenting opinion. Id.
45. Id. at 725 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
46. Fish, 741 A.2d at 725 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
Vol. 38:873
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - CHILDREN OUT-OF-WEDLOCK - PRESUMPTION
OF PATERNITY - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
presumption of paternity is applicable and irrebuttable when the
marriage that the child was born into is intact.
Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999).
On May 20, 1996, Timothy Strauser ("Appellant") filed a custody
complaint against April R. Stahr ("Appellee") in the Court of
Common Pleas, Juniata County, Civil Division.49  Appellant
contended that Amanda Stahr, the youngest child born to the
marriage of Appellee and Steven Stahr ("Husband"), is Appellant's
daughter.5 ° Appellant further asserted that Appellee acknowledged
paternity, allowed visitation, and entrusted Amanda to his care.
51
The results from a blood test of Appellant, Appellee and Amanda
revealed a 99.99% probability that Amanda was Appellant's
daughter.52 Appellant further asserted that, given the bond between
him and Amanda, it would be in the best interest of the child if he
were granted partial custody of Amanda.5 3
Appellee responded with preliminary objections seeking the
dismissal of the custody action on the basis that because Amanda
was the child of the Stahr's marriage, the presumption that Amanda
is the child of the Husband applied.54 The Husband filed a petition
to intervene (which was granted) and then filed preliminary
objections on the same ground as the Appellee.55 Husband further
asserted that Appellant was equitably estopped from asserting
paternity because Appellant "had not financially or emotionally
supported the child."5 6 On November 25, 1996, after a hearing on
preliminary objections, the Honorable Joseph Rehkamp admitted
the blood tests results and ordered a hearing on the issue of the
best interests of the child.
57
49. Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053 (Pa. 1999).
50. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1053.
51. Id.
52. Id. Since then, Appellant asserted that Appellee had frustrated his bond with
Amanda. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The presumption of paternity is that a child born to a married woman is the
child of the woman's husband. Id.
55. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1052.
56. Id.
57. Id. The trial court recognized that the case would be dismissed if it relied upon the
case law submitted by the Appellee and Husband because Appellant failed to overcome the
presumption of paternity by establishing non-access or impotency on the part of the
Husband. Id. at 1053. However, the trial court concluded that Appellee was equitably
2000
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court consolidated Appellee and
Husband's separate appeals.58 The superior court reversed the trial
court's order and dismissed Appellant's complaint with prejudice on
the basis that the presumption of paternity was irrebuttable.
59
Appellant petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
granted allocatur on the issue of whether the presumption of
paternity applies when the marriage the child is born into is intact
at the time paternity is challenged. 6°
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Thomas G. Saylor, first addressed the issue of whether the
presumption of paternity applied in the instant case; where the
marriage into which Amanda was born into is intact at the time
paternity is contested. 61 The supreme court concluded that the
presumption of paternity applied and is irrebuttable where the
marriage that the child is born into is intact at the time paternity is
contested.62 Next, the supreme court looked to whether Appellee
and Husband were estopped from invoking the presumption of
paternity.6 The issue of estoppel does not arise unless "the
presumption (of paternity) has been rebutted or is inapplicable.
" 64
In the instant case, the presumption of paternity is applicable and
estopped from contesting Amanda's paternity because she held out Amanda as Appellant's
daughter and voluntarily submitted to blood tests. Id. On the basis of the blood test results,
the trial court concluded that the presumption of paternity had been overcome. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The superior court based its findings on the fact the Stahrs remained married
and the Husband had assumed parental responsibility for Amanda. Id.
60. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1053. At the supreme court, appellant was represented by
attorney Vincent R. Mazeski, and appellee was represented by attorney Donald Zagurski. Id.
Counsel for Intervenor (Husband) was Michael H. Sholley. Id.
Justice Thomas G. Saylor wrote the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice John P
Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala and Ralph J. Cappy. Id. at 1052. Justice Russell
M. Nigro authored a dissent. Id. at 1056 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Justice Sandra Schultz
Newman also filed a dissent, joined by Justice Ronald D. Castille. Id. at 1057 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
61. Id. at 1054.
62. Id. at 1055. The court relied on its plurality opinion of Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d
176 (Pa. 1997), which asserted "the presumption is irrebuttable when a third party seeks to
assert his own paternity as against the husband in an intact marriage." Id. at 1054 (citing
Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 179).
63. Id. at 1056 (citing Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180).
Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal definition that, because of a person's
conduct (e.g., holding out the child as his own, or supporting the child), that person,
regardless of his true biological status, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor
will the child's mother who has participated in this conduct be permitted to sue a
third party for support, claiming that the third party is the true father.
Id.
64. Id. (citing Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180).
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irrebuttable, therefore, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply.65
Justice Russell M. Nigro filed a dissenting opinion expressing his
belief that the trial court properly admitted the blood test results.
66
He believed that the better approach to paternity matters is to
allow the trial courts to use their own discretion in ordering blood
testing of the parties.67
Justice Sandra Schultz Newman also filed a dissenting opinion.68
Although she agreed that the presumption of paternity applied to
the case, she disagreed that this presumption is irrebuttable.6
9
Rather, Justice Newman would follow the majority of states that
accept reliable blood tests as evidence to rebut the presumption of
paternity.70 She further advanced her argument on the basis that the
majority opinion is inconsistent with the Uniform Act on Blood
Tests to Determine Paternity.71 This act grants a trial court the
authority to order the parties to blood testing when paternity is
relevant in a matter.72 A trial court then can rebut the presumption
of paternity based upon the results of the blood tests.7 3
As we are rapidly approaching a new millennium, one can't help
but wonder in which millennium the majority opinion lives. The
rise of divorce, single parenting, and the age of same-sex partners
have redefined the dynamics of a "family" in today's society.
65. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1056.
66. Id. (Nigro, J. dissenting).
67. Id. (Nigro, J. dissenting).
68. Id. at 1057 (Newman, J. dissenting). Justice Castille joined in the dissenting
opinion. Id. at 1058.
69. Id. at 1057 (Newman, J. dissenting).
70. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1058 (Newman, J. dissenting).
71. Id. (Newman, J. dissenting).
72. Id. The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity states in pertinent part:
(c) Authority for test. - In any matter subject to this section in which paternity,
parentage, or identity of a child is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative or
upbn suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved, may or,
upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not to delay the
proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to
blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to the test, the court may resolve the
question of paternity, parentage or identity of a child against the party or enforce its
order if the rights of others and the interests of justice.
P. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5104 (c) (West 1994).
73. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1058 (Newman, J. dissenting). The Uniform Act of Blood
Tests to Determine Paternity states in pertinent part,
(g) Effect on presumption of legitimacy. - The presumption of legitimacy of a child
born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the
experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the husband is
not the father of the child.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5104 (g) (West 1994).
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Moreover, reliable scientific evidence is now being used in other
facets of the law. The union of social realities and scientific
evidence has antiquated the concept of the presumption of
paternity. It may be the case- that the majority, cognitive of social
times, is desperately trying to preserve the notion of the
"traditional" family. However, the law reaches its greatest
achievement when it reflects societal changes. It is time for the
majority to reflect upon these changes.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - CONDITIONAL GIFr - ENGAGEMENT RING -
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the donor of an
engagement ring is entitled to its return, or its equivalent value,
even though the donor terminated the engagement.
Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999).
In August of 1993, Rodger Lindh ("Donor") proposed marriage to
Janis Surman ("Donee").7 4 The Donee accepted the marriage
proposal along with a diamond engagement ring. 5  For
approximately the next year and a half the couple had a turbulent
relationship, finally ending in March of 1994, when the Donor
called off the engagement for the last time and asked for the return
of the engagement ring.76 The Donee refused to return the
engagement ring.
77
The Donor filed a two-count complaint in the Court of Common
Pleas, Allegheny County, Civil Division against the Donee seeking
the return of the ring, or a judgment for its equivalent value. 7 The
matter was submitted to arbitration, which resulted in favor of the
Donee. 79 The Donor appealed to the Court of Common Pleas,
Allegheny County, where the Honorable Mazur awarded the Donor
$21,200 for the engagement ring.80 The Donee then appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which upheld the trial court
decision.8' Losing the last two battles, but determined to win the
74. Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999). This was the first marriage for the
Donee. Id. The Donor had been previously married. Id.
75. Lindh, 742 A.2d at 643. The Donor purchased the engagement ring for $17,400, a
price that was below market value. Id.
76. Id. In October of 1993, the Donor broke the engagement and asked for the return
of the engagement ring. Id. The Donee returned the ring. Id. However, the couple reconciled
and again the Donor proposed marriage, and the ring, which the Donee once again accepted.
Id. at 64344.
77. Id. at 644.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Lindh, 742 A.2d at 644.
81. Id. The superior court affirmed the trial court's decision 2-1. Id. The majority held
Vol. 38:873
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war, the Donee petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur on the unique issue
of whether a donor is entitled to the return of an engagement ring
when the donor terminates the engagement.
8 2
To begin its analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by Justice
Sandra Schultz Newman, first answered the following two
questions: (1) was the condition of the gift the acceptance of the
marriage proposal or the marriage itself; and (2) whether fault
determines the return of the ring.83 The court rationalized that
Pennsylvania case law clearly recognized that an implied condition
to an engagement gift is the condition that the marriage must
occur'4 Therefore, a donee does not vest title in the gift until the
marriage itself occurs.
8 5
The supreme court next turned to whether to apply a fault-based
or no-fault based theory when determining whether a donor is
entitled to the return of an engagement ring.86 The supreme court
noted that under a fault-based analysis, a trial court would have to
assess not only who terminated the engagement, but also the
that a no-fault analysis applied Id. Judge Schiller wrote a dissenting opinion expressing his
belief in examining the motives behind a donor's termination of an engagement. Id.
82. Id. At the supreme court, Janis Surman was represented by attorney Frank E. Reily
from Pittsburgh, and Roger Lindh was represented by attorney Joanne Ross Wilder from
Pittsburgh. Id. at 643.
Justice Sandra Schultz Newman wrote the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice
John P. Flaherty, Jr. and Justices Stephen A. Zappala and Russell M. Nigro. Id. at 643.
Justice Ralph J. Cappy filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ronald D. Castille and
Thomas G. Saylor. Id. at 647 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Castille also authored a dissent,
joined by Justices Cappy and Saylor. Id. at 648 (Castille, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 644. The parties agreed that Pennsylvania law treats the giving of an
engagement ring as a conditional gift. Id. The Donee argued that the acceptance of the
marriage proposal vests the donee absolute title in the engagement ring. Id. If the court
recognized the condition of the gift as the occurrence of a marriage ceremony, then it would
reward a donor who, solely through his own actions, frustrates the condition of the gift. Id.
84. Id. at 645. The Pennsylvania Superior Court analyzed that:
It does not appear whether the engagement was broken by the plaintiff or whether it
was dissolved by mutual consent. It follows that in order to permit a recovery by
plaintiff, it would be necessary to hold that the gifts were subject to the implied
condition that they would be returned by the donee to the donor whenever the
engagement was dissolved. Under such a rule the marriage would be a necessary
prerequisite to the passing of an absolute title to a Christmas gift made in such
circumstances. We are unwilling to go that far, except as to the engagement ring.
Id. at 644-45 (citing Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 535, 540 (1930)).
Later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, "[Tihe promise to return an antenuptial
gift made in contemplation of marriage if the marriage does not take place is a fictitious
promise implied in law." Id. at 645. (citing Semenza v. Alfano, 279 A.2d 29, 31 (Pa. 1971)).
85. Lindh, 742 A.2d at 645.
86. Id.
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reasons behind that person's decision to terminate the
engagement.87 This inquiry, the supreme court stated, "would invite
the parties to stage the most bitter and unpleasant accusations
against those whom they nearly made their spouse, and a court
would have no clear guidance with regard to how to ascertain who
was 'at fault.' "88 However, a no-fault approach would alleviate the
situations described above because a trial court would not
investigate the circumstances behind the termination of the
engagement.8 9 If the marriage does not occur, a no-fault system
dictates the return of the engagement ring, plain and simply.90
Furthermore, the supreme court looked to jurisdictions that had
adopted no-fault principles to engagement ring cases by borrowing
from their legislatures the no fault system of divorce.91
The supreme court, persuaded by the jurisdictions which have
adopted a no-fault system and leery of the inherent weaknesses of
a fault-based system, adopted a no-fault approach to engagement
ring cases.92 Furthermore the supreme court declined to adopt a
"modified" no-fault rule that would deny the donor of the
engagement ring when the donor ends the engagement.93
Justice Ralph J. Cappy filed a dissenting opinion expressing his
view that the determination of engagement ring cases should be
solved under conditional gift law analysis.94 He chided the majority
for their unwillingness to allow trial courts to dirty their hands on
an issue of law which is no more "sordid" than issues that are
litigated daily.
95
Justice Ronald D. Castille also filed a dissenting opinion.96 He
believed that a better approach to resolving the issue is to follow




90. Lindh, 742 A.2d at 645.
91. Id. at 646. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1987); and
Vigil v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455 (N.M. 1994).
92. Lindh, 742 A2d 646.
93. Id. The Donee argued that this would be consistent with a no-fault approach
because a court would not look into the motives behind terminating the engagement, but
only at the proof that the donor ended the engagement. Id.
94. Id. at 646-48 (Cappy, J. dissenting). Justices Castille and Saylor joined in the
dissenting opinion. Id. at 646.
95. Id. at 647-648 (Cappy, J. dissenting).
96. Id. at 648 (Castille, J. dissenting). Justices Cappy and Saylor joined in the
dissenting opinion. Id.




restatement explains that engagement gifts are generally not
conditional and absent fraud or purposes only obtainable by
marriage, the donee retains the gift if the marriage fails to occur by
no fault of the donee.9 8
Scholars and practitioners alike have long awaited the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to rule on the issue of whether fault
is relevant in determining the return of an engagement ring. The
decision should come as no shock to those who have closely
followed this issue. First, Pennsylvania decisional law pointed in
the direction of a no-fault approach. Second, a majority of states
follow a no-fault approach. The majority opinion clearly
emphasized the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's unwillingness to
create excess litigation in our already backlogged trial court system
by requiring trial courts to assess fault in determining which party
retains possession of an engagement ring.
Gifts made in the hope that a marriage or contract of marriage will result are not
recoverable, in the absence of fraud. Gifts made in anticipation of marriage are not
ordinarily expressed to be conditional and, although there is an engagement to marry,
if the marriage fails to occur without the fault of the donee, normally the gift cannot
be recovered. If, however, the donee obtained the gift fraudulently or if the gift was
made for a purpose which could be obtained only by the marriage, a donor who is not
himself at fault is entitled to restitution if the marriage does not take place, even if
the gift was money. If there is an engagement to marry and the donee, having received
the gift without fraud, later wrongfully breaks the promise of marriage, the donor is
entitled to restitution if the gift is an engagement ring, a family heirloom or other
similar thing intimately connected with the marriage, but not if the gift is one of
money intended to be used by the donee before the marriage.
RESTATEMENT OF RFSMrUnON § 58, cmt. c (1976).
98. Lindh, 742 A.2d at 648 (Castille, J. dissenting).
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